Increasingly high health, safety and environmental standards are being demanded across all areas of life, both by regulatory authorities and the general public, whose awareness of issues has grown. In today's highly competitive business environment, it has become unacceptable to operate in a way which risks injuring people or damaging the environment. Companies that cannot assure bealth, safety and environmental compliance are subject to legal sanctions and loss of public support, leading to what could be catastrophic effects on reputation and revenue. This is why every plant, factory and office building has a safety system of risk mitigation, often described as a 'layer of protection', designed to protect people -both employees and the public -the environment and, of course, its own productivity, equipment and assets.
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Nowhere are the potential implications of not complying to health, safety and environmental standards more serious tban in industrial plants that operate automated manufacturing processes. Such processes often involve heavy equipment, furnaces, chemicals and gases, and a failure in the process could potentially lead to undesirable hazards such as explosions, fires, and chemical leaks.
An integral part of a process industry manufacturing plant's 'layer of protection' is tbe instrumented protective system, made up primarily of trips and alarms.
Alarms alert operators that something is wrong within the plant, enabling them to take action to prevent the further development of a potentially dangerous situation. Trips are designed to shut down the plant in a controlled manner if a potentially dangerous situation arises, for example, an electrical problem that could cause a fire or an explosion.
Also integrated into a plant's total safety system, working in conjunction with the trip and alarm system, might be: o A plant operating control system designed for normal operational parameters. o Bursting discs or relief valves that provide additional protection to trips and alarms in events where, for example, pressure is building up in a steam-generating system. o Bunds around tanks and vessels to contain any overfill of fluids, e.g. chemicals, preventing leakage into a river or drain. o A set of emergency procedures and services for boundary and external site mitigation.
Because it plays such a crucial role in controlling potential accident hazards, it is vital that the trip and alarm system itself does not malfunction. Proper design and installation are necessary, and it is obligatory to maintain the system effectively and function test it at regular intervals, to reveal any covert failures of the system and satisfy the integrity and risk acceptability criteria of the installation.
Making the grade
Plants are expected to comply with stringent regulations that ensure they are designing, operating, testing and maintaining their trip and alarm systems in line with industry best practice.
Currently, this means complying with the principles of IEC 61508, an international standard defined by the IEC (International Electrotechnical Commission) that addresses safety-related programmable electronic systems like trips and alarms, whose failure could have an impact on people, the environment, and/or plant operations.
The safety life cycle
Under IEC 61508, a set of key criteria needs to be met by a plant to demonstrate that appropriate functionality is built into trip and alarm equipment, and that it is maintained effectively. These criteria include: o The design basis for its trip and alarm system must be documented and traceable. o The plant must prove it is testing the system for functionality and reliability by appropriate methods. o It must also prove tests are held at the required intervals. o Repairs must be shown to be managed appropriately. o Technical records for the instrumented safety loop must be maintained.
o Analysis of failures and corrective actions must be conducted.
One framework to aid plants in del ivery ofcompliance with these criteria is the life cycle strategy and supporting guidance found within IEC 61508.
The project life cycle approach is in essence a cradle-tograve strategy that can guide a plant through every phase of an instrumentation project, including trips and alarms, from initial conception through to de-commissioning.
The cycle begins with definition of the equipment and processes for which functional safety is being sought. A following series of phases provides a logical path through detailed design, commissioning, operation, maintenance and finally decommissioning.
Within this life cycle, four key areas for discussion are identified in relation to initial design and on-going operation, maintenance and modification of safety-related systems. Figure J displays the lifecycle, and highlights the phases within these key areas.
SIL (Safety Integrity Level) determination
The key to maintaining the protection of operating assets while reducing spurious trips, which wastes time and lowers productivity, is the determination and implementation of the safety requirements for the safety system under consideration. 
Planning
During life cycle phases 4/5, as shown in the diagram, a plant should undertake the essential process of determination and implementation of its functional safety requirements, of which one aspect will be the identification of an Instrumented Protective System with an appropriate Safety Integrity Level (SIL).
The SIL is fundamental in ensuring that an instrumented safety-related system satisfactorily performs the required safety functions, under all stated conditions, within a defined period of time. It is an assessment of the risk reduction needed from the system in order to contribute to an overall level of tolerable risk.
The system needs regular testing to ensure that it continues to provide the correct level of protection. Because testing disrupts the production process, how test intervals are determined is a key element of an organisation's functional safety testing strategy. It is important to the business and its profitability that any testing is cost-effective, and test intervals are optimised and proportionate to the perceived risk.
Inappropriate SIL determination can affect the safety integrity of the plant and also lead to unnecessary spend in capital and operational budgets.
Properly defmed SIL levels, and hence appropriate testing frequencies, will benefit an orgarusation greatly, enabling significant cost improvements to be achieved in both greenfield and brownfield operating environments, and ensuring that asset-operational SJLs can be maintained whilst the costs of on-going testing and maintenance are kept at a minimum.
In order to correctly determine its SIL, organisations should base their decisions on appropriate hazard and reliability data, optimise test intervals so they are appropriate for the equipment lUlder control (EUe) and cost-effective, use quantitative methods, be rigorous in the research process to achieve consistency and obtain meaningful results, justify the techniques and measures used, and document the decision basis, Once the target SIL of the instrumented safetyrelated system has been identified, the requirements can be passed into phase 9 of the lEC 6t508 life cycle for detailed design, installation and commissioning.
Operations, maintenance and modification
The later phases of the life cycle, as indicated in Figure 1 above, are concerned with the on-going operation, maintenance and modification of the installed instrumented safety-related system, including trips and alarms.
To guarantee the initiation of a successful plant maintenance plan, organisations need to make sure that procedures are implemented, schedules are followed, documentation is maintained, regular safety audits are performed, and any modifications made are fuBy documented.
The IEC 61508 standard also calls for the chronological recording of the results ofaudits and tests, the time and cause of demands on the safety system and its response, any faults found during maintenance, and documentation of modifications.
Putting theory into practice
Undertaking all the testing, scheduling of tests, recording and reporting of data and management of a trip and alann system that is required to follow the project life cycle and demonstrate compliance with the IEC 61508 standard is a challenge for any plant.
Most plants use one of three methods of managing, scheduling and reporting on the operations and maintenance of their trip and alarm systems, as part of their overall maintenance strategies. The options are: o Use of an existing business management system, where trip and alarm data is managed together with all other maintenance requirements. OUse of non-bespoke packages that have basic scheduling functions to capture some trip and alarm data. o Use of tailored bespoke trip and alarm management software packages.
Existing business management systems
The advantage tof using existing business management systems to manage trip and alarm systems is that they are already installed, and due to their size they are capable of taking care of the whole spectrum of plant maintenance activities from one place.
However, using these larger systems to manage trip and alarm testing can work out more expensive, due to the inputting of test result data proving fraught and lengthy. Such business systems tend to be rather 'control/electrical unfriendly', designed for the inputting of maintenance history and records that are 'mechanically' biased, rather than the detailed technical information associated with trip and alarm systems. This results in inefficient use of engineers' and technicians' time.
Larger business management systems can also be very slow if the volume of traffic on the user's network is high, as it is used for the management of so many different things.
Non-bespoke packages
These systems are often purchased by organisations in the control/electrical fraternity that do not have larger maintenance packages in place, and they tend at the outset to be geared to a specific control/electrical engineering aspect such as document control registries or loop drawing design packages.
With this type of system it is often only possible to record some of the detail of the data relevant to the trip and alarm system, as it is not dedicated for this purpose.
They can be reconfigured over time to produce some form of trip and alarm management system, but this may not be appropriate for legislative requirements. Normally the methodologies are difficult to control and the quality of accessible data is extremely poor, plus on-going support and system knowledge can be easily fragmented and lost, as the configuration engineers who were originally responsible move away.
Bespoke systems
Many plants, recognising the huge significance of their trip and alarm systems, are now turning to systems that are specifically designed and configured to focus on the trip and alarm loop functionality. These systems can be customised and revised quickly to precisely match the individual plant's requirements, in a cost-effective manner.
As the methodology and technical requirements ofsuch systems have been specifically evolved towards the area of safety-related equipment, the functionality provides the necessary historical background linking the management of the trip and alarm functions and the frequency of testing required.
Bespoke systems are quick and efficient to implement and operate by the user, and are focused in response and operational time. They are a cost-effective alternative to larger mainframe maintenance packages and, as they can be run from a stand-alone PC or dedicated server, their per-fOlmance is not affected by network traffic. This is partic-ularly useful during plant start-up and shutdown periods.
There are various kinds of bespoke management software on the market that directly address the requirements of trip and alarm systems, taking into account new legislation, and in accordance with the requirements of IEC 61508. ABB Eutech, for example, has developed its PC-based TRAC software program to help project and maintenance engineers to determine the optimum design configuration and required SIL, including the periodic test intervals, of a plant's instrumented protective system including trips and alarms.
Software like this is designed to provide repeatable calculations from a set of consistent failure data, which ensures effective and appropriate functionality to maintain the required level of safety, environmental and/or asset protection. By focusing on the relevance of the system and consequence of failure on demand, and using reliability and IEC Risk Graph methodologies, an optimum range of test intervals for the trip and alarm system can be calculated, set against the projected annualised cost.
The benefit is a reduction in the maintenance burden while remaining compliant with regulatory and organisational requirements, and having supportable auditable documentation.
Where the SIL will not be affected, test intervals can be extended to coincide with a plant shutdown, for maximum convenience, or set simply to 'repair on breakdown', for example. For each span of test intervals a cost of testing is calculated from known annual testing costs. Results are displayed graphically and a comprehensive report is issued with fully traceable and archived decision processes. There are also software packages on the market that help organisations with the management, scheduling, reporting and technical specification data storage, of plant trip and alann safety or product critical systems. ABB Eutech's TRAMS software is one example.
The idea behind such software is to enable trip and alarm data to be managed in a flexible and efficient manner, and provide customised reports that support effective management decisions.
All relevant data are drawn together in a user-friendly database, allowing the demonstration of the selection of appropriate SILs; aiding the reduction of maintenance costs by proof testing at optimum intervals using written test methods and specified set-point tolerances; providing accurate reporting of proof test results and status quickly and efficiently; and processing trip and alarm reporting data for easy review of safety system performance. Safety function items that have poor availability and require improvement are also identified.
This enables plants to meet the operational demands oflEC 61508 by showing that the design basis of its trip and alarm system is documented and traceable, proving it is testing by the appropriate methods and at the required intervals, managing repairs appropriately, maintaining technical records for the instrumented safety loop and analysing failures and corrective actions.
Plants can also ensure their trip and alarm system instmmentation complies with the ATEX directive by choosing software specifically designed for the management, scheduling, reporting and technical specification data storage of electrical and mechanical equipment deployed within hazardous areas.
The HAZAlR (HAZardous Area Inspection and Repair) software from ABB Eutech, for example, manages inspections and repairs of electrical equipment in potentially explosive atmospheres, reports on inspections, and identifies equipment with high fault rates.
